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ABSTRACT
Ex-felons are routinely denied the right to vote after successful completion of their sentences. Over six million
people are currently denied the right to vote because of a prior felony conviction. This undermines the principles of
democracy, the goals of the criminal justice system, and the political process. In Richardson v. Ramirez, the
Supreme Court found an express textual warrant for denying the right to vote to those convicted of crimes in
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article argues that people of color are disproportionately impacted
by felony disenfranchisement laws because of the disproportionate impact of mass incarceration on communities of
color. This Article then examines the tools voting rights advocates use to challenge felony disenfranchisement laws,
including state constitutions, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause. It ultimately
concludes that these tools have failed to produce widespread, replicable success because courts generally require a
showing of intentional racial discrimination, which is difficult to prove. Further, there is a circuit split as to
whether the Voting Rights Act applies to felony disenfranchisement laws. Because of the inadequacies of the
available legal tools, this Article concludes that Congress should adopt a federal statute which provides that states
cannot disenfranchise people on the basis of a prior felony conviction or prior felony convictions for which they have
completed their sentences.
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INTRODUCTION
Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of discrimination—employment
discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of
educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and
exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal. As a criminal, you have scarcely
more rights . . . than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow.
— Michelle Alexander1

“1994. Miami. I was snatching a gold chain. And I did 31 months.”2
Justin was sixteen years old at the time.3 In Florida, prior to the November
2018 elections, during which Florida voters approved a constitutional
amendment that restored voting rights to over one million people with prior
felony convictions,4 ex-felons had to petition the state government in order
to restore their voting rights.5 After a mandatory waiting period, Justin filed
to restore his right to cast a ballot in 2004.6 Not long after he filed to restore
his voting rights, Justin earned a master’s degree in accounting and found a
stable job.7 In 2015, after waiting nearly eleven years to see the clemency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 2 (2d ed. 2012).
Renata Sago, Ex-Felons Fight to Restore Their Right to Vote, NPR (Dec. 11, 2015, 5:22 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/12/11/459365215/ex-felons-fight-to-restore-their-right-to-vote.
Id.
Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida.
Sago, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.

Mar. 2019]

FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS

1073

board, his voting rights were finally restored.8 Kelli Griffin, a mother of four
in Iowa, lost her right to vote in 2008 after a conviction for a nonviolent drug
offense.9 In 2013, on Election Day, she registered to vote and cast her ballot
in a local election.10 Two months later, she was arrested and charged with
voter fraud.11 Her defense attorney at the time of her conviction told her
that she would be eligible to vote after she served her probation, which was
true at the time.12 Then, the law changed so that all people with a felony
conviction on their record in Iowa lose their voting rights permanently.13 She
told the local county attorney that she did not know about the law change,
but her case was not dismissed, and a jury acquitted her after forty minutes.14
Although Griffin still cannot vote, she says she is a changed person and that
she should “be able to vote in things regarding [her] child’s school, regarding
[her] community, regarding things [that are] happening in [her] life because
it affects [her].”15
In spite of popular misconceptions about who is affected by felony
disenfranchisement laws, the President of the Florida Rights Restoration
Coalition, Desmond Meade, notes that “[w]hen you think of the typical
person that cannot vote . . . it’s not the African-American guy who murdered
a million people. It’s not that crazed killer or rapist, no . . . [t]he typical
person who cannot vote was, probably years ago, convicted of some low-level
offense.”16 According to a report by The Sentencing Project, “6.1 million
Americans are forbidden to vote because of ‘felony disenfranchisement,’ or
laws restricting voting rights for those convicted of felony-level crimes.”17
The problem is pervasive: one out of every forty adult citizens or 2.5 percent
of the total U.S. voting age population is unable to vote because of a current

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id.
Griffin v. Pate, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 30, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/cases/griffin-vpate.
Kelli Jo Griffin, I Was Arrested for Voting, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/i-was-arrested-voting.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mom Arrested for Voting in Iowa, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?15=&v=1uAZTAX0Jp4.
Sago, supra note 2.
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf (quotation marks omitted). According to The Sentencing
Project, this number has increased drastically in recent years. Id. In 1976, there were only 1.17
million people similarly disenfranchised, and, in 1996, there were only 3.34 million. Id.
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or past felony conviction.18 Although currently only three states permanently
disenfranchise all people with prior felony convictions,19 numerous other
states disenfranchise at least some people with criminal convictions.20 In
total, approximately a third of all states deny voting rights to some or all of
those who have successfully completed their sentences, “unless they obtain
reinstatement of voting rights.”21
Additionally, there is a disparate impact on black Americans specifically.
Over 7.4 percent of African-Americans are disenfranchised.22 One out of
every thirteen African-Americans is unable to vote, a number which is four
times higher than the disenfranchisement rate of non-African-American
voters.23 Only 1.8 percent of non-African-American voters are unable to
vote, or one out of every fifty-six non-black voters.24
This Article examines felony disenfranchisement laws in the United
States, including analyses of the various tools used by attorneys to challenge
felony disenfranchisement statutes. This Article also considers the
weaknesses of each of those tools and the importance of finding new and
innovative ways to use those tools to challenge felony disenfranchisement
laws through the courts. This Article further considers the importance of
alternate routes of advocacy outside of the courtroom through the legislative
branch and the political process, ultimately concluding that legislation is
necessary to re-enfranchise citizens whose ability to vote is unfairly withheld
by their states’ laws.

18
19

20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Chris Kenning, Locked Out: Critics Say it’s Time to End Kentucky’s Ban on Felon Voting, LOUISVILLE
COURIER J. (Nov. 12, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2018/11/
11/kentucky-among-last-permanently-ban-felons-voting-rights/1924690002/.
The state
constitutions of Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia permanently disenfranchise all people with felony
convictions unless the government provides an individual pardon. Editorial, Florida Restored Voting
Rights to Former Felons. Now the GOP Wants to Thwart Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://wapo.st/2FoflYh. Notably, Virginia’s former Governor, Terry McAuliffe, signed an
executive order which restored voting rights to former felons in Virginia who had completed their
sentences, but the Virginia Supreme Court held that the executive order violated their state
constitution. Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 724 (Va. 2016). Still, during Governor
McAuliffe’s four-year term, he restored voting rights to nearly 200,000 ex-felons. Editorial, Virginia
Should Do More to Restore Felons’ Voting Rights, VIRGINIAN–PILOT (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://pilotonline.com/opinion/editorial/article_1ddcf28c-e3bd-11e8-9a7f-270adefbc95c.html.
Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx/.
DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30–31 (2013).
UGGEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
Id.
Id.; Felony Disenfranchisement, SENTENCING PROJECT http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/
felony-disenfranchisement/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
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Part I examines the history of felony disenfranchisement laws and
analyzes Richardson v. Ramirez,25 the landmark Supreme Court decision that
upheld the practice of disenfranchising felons, even those who have
completed their sentences. Part II examines the effect of mass incarceration
on voting rights, including an analysis of the disparate impact of felony
disenfranchisement laws on people of color. This Part concludes that the
rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system in a democracy are best
served by promoting true reintegration into society through active
citizenship, including voting.
Part III then explores litigation challenging felony disenfranchisement
laws since Richardson v. Ramirez. This Part analyzes the ways in which various
courts have ruled in response to those challenges, including challenges under
state constitutions, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Part IV ultimately
argues that Congress should enact a federal statute which provides that the
rights of citizens of the United States to vote in federal elections shall not be
denied or abridged by the individual states on account of a prior felony
conviction or prior felony convictions for which they have completed their
sentences. This Part notes that Congress may not have the authority to
legislate regarding felony disenfranchisement but nonetheless concludes that
federal legislation is the best option.
I. THE HISTORY OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
In Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all
qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. A consistent
line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict
the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear. It has been repeatedly
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to
vote . . . .26

As inspirational as Chief Justice Warren’s words may be, and as vital as
the right to vote is in a representative democracy, it is important to note one
phrase in particular: all qualified citizens to vote. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the right to vote has allowed for several qualifications in
determining eligibility to vote, and not everyone is qualified. The
Constitution does not affirmatively grant or deny anyone the right to vote,
and, generally, the right to vote is restricted for “noncitizens, nonresidents,
25
26

418 U.S. 24 (1974).
377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
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minors, people deemed incompetent, and [depending on state law,] people
convicted of felonies.”27 Disenfranchising felons is not a new idea and is not
unique to the United States. The practice of felony disenfranchisement has
a long global history.28 The following Sections examine the history of felony
disenfranchisement laws and the Supreme Court case which established their
constitutionality.
A. The Idea of Civil Death
The idea of “civil death” dates back to at least ancient Greece and
Rome.29 Civil death deprived citizens of basic civil rights, including the right
to vote, when they committed crimes and broke the social contract of a
political body.30 In Greece, criminal offenders lost citizenship rights,
“including the right to participate in the polis (polity).”31 In Rome, those who
committed infamous crimes lost “the right to vote, participate in court
proceedings, or defend the homeland.”32 Even after the fall of the Roman
Empire, the practice remained popular throughout medieval Europe and
eventually became part of English common-law tradition.33 Proponents of
civil death statutes believed that they deterred undesirable, unlawful, and
corrupt behaviors and served the retributive goals of a criminal justice
system.34
Disenfranchisement laws were also used in colonial-era America,
although it is unclear how well-enforced or prevalent they were.35 One
disenfranchisement statute in Connecticut stated that “if any person within
these Libberties have been or shall be fyned or whipped for any scandalous
offence, hee shall not bee admitted after such time to have any voate in
Towne or Commonwealth, nor to serve in the Jury, until the courte shall
27
28
29

30
31
32
33
34
35

TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 13.
Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 562 (2003).
See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 16 (2006) (discussing
the Greek and Roman practices of “infamia” which subjected to “civil death” members of the polity
who committed crimes); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23 (2008) (describing the “civil death”
practices of Ancient Greece and Rome and Medieval Europe); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS,
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 28–29 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the evolution of the
Roman practice of “infamia”).
HULL, supra note 29, at 16; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 23; PETTUS, supra note 29, at 28.
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 23.
HULL, supra note 29, at 16.
Id.; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 22.
HULL, supra note 29, at 16; Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 562.
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 24.
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manifest theire satisfaction.”36 Massachusetts denied the right to vote for
“any shamefull and vitious crime.”37 Maryland imposed loss of political
rights as a punishment for “multiple incidences of public drunkenness.”38
Virginia also had a law forbidding former felons from exercising the right to
vote,39 and disenfranchisement laws ultimately became common; “[b]efore
the Civil War, nineteen of the thirty-four states in the Union had adopted
[legislation to prevent ex-felons from voting], and by 1869 twenty-nine had
done so.”40
During the formative years of the United States, only white male
property owners were allowed to vote; thus, it is clear that the early versions
of “civic death” statutes were not motivated by racial animus.41 However,
after the Civil War, legislators responded to the extension of the right to vote
to black males through the Reconstruction Amendments by adopting new
disenfranchisement laws or creating harsher disenfranchisement laws,
seeming to purposefully restrict voting rights of black Americans.42 Between
1890 and 1910, many states in the South held “disenfranchising”
constitutional conventions43 at which they adopted new laws aimed at
disenfranchising black voters, including felony disenfranchisement laws,
“literacy tests, grandfather and ‘understanding’ clauses, property
qualifications, and poll taxes.”44
According to “the president of Alabama’s all-white 1901 convention,”
“the purpose of these various measures . . . was ‘within the limits imposed by
the Federal Constitution to establish white supremacy.’”45 In 1901, Alabama
altered its state constitution and added “wife-beating” to the list of crimes
which warranted disenfranchisement.46 One legislator reasoned that “[t]he
crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify 60 percent of the Negroes.”47

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id.
HULL, supra note 29, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
See id. at 18 (citing statistical analysis that shows most of the disfranchisement laws adopted after the
Civil War were adopted as a result of backlash against the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment);
Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 566–68 (showing a massive increase in the number of states that
disenfranchise, and that disenfranchise felons in the run up to, as well as after, the Civil War).
PETTUS, supra note 29, at 34.
HULL, supra note 29, at 18; PETTUS, supra note 9, at 34.
HULL, supra note 29, at 18.
Id. at 20.
Editorial, A Meaningful Move on Voting Rights in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/opinion/alabama-governor-felons-voting.html; see also
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In 1877, Georgia added a “moral turpitude” clause to the disenfranchising
clause of its state constitution.48 In Mississippi, nearly three-quarters of
eligible black voters were registered voters in 1867.49 However, after the state
adopted its new criminal code, the number of eligible registered black voters
dropped to less than six percent.50 At Mississippi’s constitutional convention
in 1890, the legislature “replaced an 1869 provision disenfranchising citizens
convicted of ‘any crime’ with a narrower one barring only those found guilty
of certain petty offenses for which [they believed] blacks had an apparent
proclivity.”51 Further, Mississippi allowed convicted rapists and murderers
to exercise the right to vote, along with those convicted of “‘robust’ crimes to
which whites were susceptible.”52 However, those convicted of “‘furtive
offenses’ to which blacks were reputedly inclined—such as bribery, perjury,
bigamy, or miscegenation—forfeited their voting privileges into
perpetuity.”53 Thus, for nearly a hundred years, those convicted of rape and
murder could exercise the right to vote in Mississippi, but those convicted of
violating the ban against interracial marriage could not.54 In 1850, only
about a third of states prevented ex-felons from voting.55 By 1920, more than
three-fourths of states had adopted felony disenfranchisement laws.56
However, in spite of the prevalence of felony disenfranchisement statutes and
circuit court splits on their legality, the Supreme Court did not address felony
disenfranchisement laws or constitutional provisions directly until 1974.57

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

HULL, supra note 29, at 20.
PETTUS, supra note 29, at 34.
HULL, supra note 29, at 21 (“Almost 70 percent of eligible blacks were registered to vote in
Mississippi in 1867 . . . .”).
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974). In 1885, the Supreme Court indirectly addressed
felony disenfranchisement by unanimously upholding the Edmunds Act, “which outlawed bigamy
and polygamy in the territories and disenfranchised anyone convicted of either.” MANZA &
UGGEN, supra note 29, at 28 (describing Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 59, 79 (1885)). In 1890,
the Supreme Court upheld an Idaho state constitutional provision which “allow[ed] the state to
disenfranchise bigamists.” MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 28–29 (describing Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 347 (1890)). The Court concluded that the Idaho statute was “not open to any
constitutional or legal objection.” Davis, 133 U.S. at 347.
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B. Affirming States’ Rights to Punish in Perpetuity
In Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court issued a six-to-three opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist in which it upheld disenfranchising provisions
of the California Constitution and several sections of the California Elections
Code that disenfranchised felons.58 The Court reversed the California
Supreme Court’s decision applying strict scrutiny to the California
restrictions which held that “the enforcement of . . . statutes regulating the
voting process and penalizing its misuse—rather than outright
disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crime—[was] . . . the method of
preventing election fraud which [was] the least burdensome” on the right to
vote.59 According to the California Supreme Court, denying the right to vote
to “ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole [had] expired” violated
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.60 However, the
Supreme Court focused on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
notes that representation for states that deny the right to vote to male citizens
“except for participation in rebellion, or other crime . . . shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”61 The
Court accepted the defendant’s argument that “those who framed and
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to prohibit
outright in [Section 1] of that Amendment that which was expressly
exempted from the lesser section of reduced representation imposed by
[Section 2] of the Amendment.”62 The Court also noted that, at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, over half of the states included
provisions in their state constitutions that disenfranchised those convicted of
felonies or other infamous crimes.63

58
59
60
61
62
63

Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26–31.
Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (Cal. 1973), rev’d sub nom. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
See id. at 48 (“[A]t the time of the adoption of the Amendment, 29 States had provisions in their
constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise
by persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes.”).
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The Court examined the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting that the legislative history of Section 2 was scarce but
also that “[w]hat little comment there was on the phrase in question . . .
support[ed] a plain reading of it.”64 Even though several alterations to the
language of Section 2 were suggested during the floor debates in the House
and the Senate, “the language ‘except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime’ was never altered.”65 Still, the Court noted the lack of relevant
legislative history. Although the wording of Section 2 was discussed at length,
“most of the discussion was devoted to its foreseeable consequences in both
the Northern and Southern States, and to arguments as to its necessity or
wisdom.”66
The Court also noted that a legislative solution was more appropriate
than a judicial one to address the issue of felony disenfranchisement, stating
that “it is not for [the Court] to choose one set of values over the other.”67
The Court reasoned that if a “more modern view is that it is essential to the
process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society
as a fully participating citizen,” then the Court would not “discount [those]
arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh
and balance them.”68 Thus, the Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains an express sanction of states’ rights to strip ex-felons of
the right to vote.69 The Court reversed the Supreme Court of California’s
judgment, concluding that the California court had erred in holding that
California could not disenfranchise convicted felons who had completed
their sentences.70 However, Justice Marshall wrote a fervent dissent, and
many others have criticized the Court’s decision and analysis.71

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the
Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259,
313–15 (2004); Anthony Gray, Securing Felons' Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L.
& POL’Y 3, 9–10 (2014); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to
Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368–69 (2003); David J. Zeitlin, Revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez:
The Constitutional Bounds of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement, 70 ALA. L. REV. 259, 281 (2018).
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Justice Marshall reasoned that voting is a fundamental right,72 noting
that “neither the fact that several States had ex-felon disenfranchisement
laws at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor that such
disenfranchisement was specifically excepted from the special remedy of § 2,
[could] serve to insulate such disenfranchisement from equal protection
scrutiny.”73 He noted that there was minimal legislative history regarding
“the crucial words ‘or other crime.’”74 He argued that the purpose of
Section 2 was to create a remedy of reduced representation to address a
specific problem, the denial of the right to vote to eligible black voters, and
that just “because Congress chose to exempt one form of electoral
discrimination from the reduction-of-representation remedy provided by § 2
does not necessarily imply congressional approval of this
disenfranchisement.”75 He stated that “[t]he ballot is the democratic
system’s coin of the realm”76 and argued that there is no reason to think that
“ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic process than any other
citizen. Like everyone else, their daily lives are deeply affected” by the
government’s actions.77 He reasoned that modern equal protection
jurisprudence is constantly evolving and that “laws are not frozen into
immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to
the needs of a changing society.”78
He also argued that felony
disenfranchisement marginalizes ex-felons and conflicts with the
rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system.79 Thus, Justice Marshall
concluded that “the blanket disenfranchisement of ex-felons” violated the
Equal Protection Clause.80

72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

80

See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that a State may
strip ex-felons . . . of their fundamental right to vote without running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 82.
See id. at 79 (“[T]he denial of the right to vote to such persons is a hindrance to the efforts of society
to rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive citizens.” (quoting
Memorandum of the Sec’y of State of Cal. in Opposition to Certiorari, Class of Cty. Clerks &
Registrars of Voters of Cal. v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 904 (1974) (No. 73-324))).
Id. at 86.
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Others have posed additional criticisms. Section 2’s language mentions
vaguely “participation in rebellion, or other crime,” but at the time the
Framers adopted that language, the phrase was more commonly
“understood to mean ‘such crimes as are now felonies at common law,’”81
and common law felonies were narrower and fewer than the offenses which
qualify as felonies today.82 Additionally, the Court’s opinion shows how a
purely textualist approach to interpretation sometimes leads to absurd
results. The literal reading of Section 2’s language did not allow for the
Court to take into account context or changing circumstances.83 The literal
reading also failed to take into account the purpose behind the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was “to expand voting rights . . . not to allow the states to
add new restrictions.”84 When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it
was “understood as seeking to turn vague natural rights into something
concrete and defendable for African Americans, and to nationalize
citizenship to override state-level biases.”85
Interestingly, in spite of the fact that Section 2’s language “was designed
to encourage the former Confederate states to enfranchise AfricanAmericans by excluding former slaves from the state’s population for
purposes of apportioning Congress if former slaves were denied the right to
vote” after the Civil War, “no discriminating state [has ever] lost even a single
seat in the House of Representatives.”86 No court has ever ruled to exclude
disenfranchised black voters from a state’s population count, even though
states in the South methodically and purposefully denied black people the
right to vote for decades after Reconstruction, during Jim Crow and
beyond.87 Thus, the representation-reducing language of Section 2 is

81
82

83
84
85
86
87

HULL, supra note 29, at 101 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 51).
See, e.g., HULL, supra note 29, at 101; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 31 (“When the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, disenfranchisement applied only to those convicted of felonies at
common law, a far more limited class of offenses than the modern conception of ‘felony.’”); John
Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2001) (arguing that “[a]ll Section 2 tells
us is that a state can deny felons the vote without opening itself to a congressional reduction of its
representation in Congress”). But see, e.g., Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice:
Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1635–38 (2012)
(noting that many radicals at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment endorsed
criminal disenfranchisement but argued against disenfranchisement based on immutable
characteristics such as race and class).
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Chin, supra note 71, at 259–60; Richard Kreitner, This Long-Lost Constitutional Clause Could Save the
Right to Vote, NATION (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/any-way-abridged/.
Id.
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essentially historical artifact88 and is not actually used to discourage states
from discriminating against voters on the basis of race as was its original
purpose.89 Instead, the Ramirez decision ironically allows Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be used to disenfranchise potential voters,
disproportionately people of color,90 the very group of people the Fourteenth
Amendment originally aimed to protect.91 Ramirez essentially legalized
discrimination, as long as the target of that discrimination has been convicted
of a felony.92
II. FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: UNDEMOCRATIC,
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AND DISCRIMINATORY
The United States imprisons its population at a higher rate than any
other country in the world, even surpassing the incarceration rates of “highly
repressive regimes like Russia, China, and Iran.”93 Germany incarcerates 93

88

89

90
91

92
93

Congress has never used the representation-reducing language to lessen representation when it
apportions itself, and courts have declined to enforce the clause. See, e.g., Saunders v. Wilkins, 152
F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1945); Chin, supra note 71, at 274 n.84 (noting that the Section 2 Clause
could be interpreted to force Southern States to choose between giving enfranchisement to all
citizens or suffer reduced representation in Congress). In 1945, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Case in which Saunders, a potential candidate for
Congress, argued that Virginia’s representation in Congress should be reduced because of
Virginia’s poll tax, which had the purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of race. Saunders,
152 F.2d at 236–37. Saunders alleged that if Virginia’s representation was reduced as it should be
according to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then Virginia would be forced to elect its
remaining members of Congress in an at-large election. Id. at 236. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, holding that Saunders’ challenge presented a nonjusticiable
political question which could only be decided by the legislative branch. Id. at 237.
See, e.g., TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 17–18 (stating that while not explicitly protecting blacks in the
Reconstruction South, the immediate passage of the Fifteenth Amendment suggests this intent);
Chin, supra note 71, at 260 (stating that no court has ever declared that disenfranchised AfricanAmericans would be excluded from a state’s population from the Plessy era to present day).
See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 31 (explaining how the Supreme Court used the phrase “other
crime” to uphold felony disenfranchisement under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chin, supra note
71, at 259 (explaining how the second sentence of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to “put Southern States to a choice—enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional
representation” (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 73–74 (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.; see also Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct. 2014, at 56, 58;
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up At a Higher Rate Than Any Other Country, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2015), http://wapo.st/1fjs79L; Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other
Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/
23iht-23prison.12253738.html. Even though the United States “has less than 5 percent of the
world’s population . . . [i]t has almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.” Id.
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out of every 100,000 children and adults.94 The United States’ incarceration
rate is nearly eight times greater than Germany’s at a rate of 750 out of every
100,000 children and adults.95 The United States also imprisons its racial
and ethnic minorities at a rate higher than any other country in the world.96
The United States is the only modern democracy which allows broad voting
bans on ex-felons through state laws which disenfranchise former criminals
seemingly irrespective of the types of crimes they committed.97 The following
Section examines the United States’ felony disenfranchisement practices in
light of mass incarceration, which places a large percentage of the United
States population under control of the criminal justice system and
disproportionately impacts people of color. The next Section considers the
goals of the criminal justice system and argues that felony disenfranchisement
laws are counterproductive and undemocratic.
A. Mass Incarceration: Legally Stripping Away the Voting Rights of People of Color
In June 1971, President Richard Nixon announced a war on drugs.98 In
1973, President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”).99 In October 1982, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed his
Administration’s commitment to the war on drugs, even though “at the time
. . . less than 2 percent of the American public viewed drugs as the most
important issue facing the nation.”100 President Reagan’s Administration
increased Federal Bureau of Investigation anti-drug funding by nearly twelve
times “from $8 million to $95 million.”101 Largely as a result of the war on
drugs and the criminalization of nonviolent drug offenses, over the past few
decades, the United States’ rates of incarceration have greatly increased:
“between 1980 and 2000, the number of people incarcerated in [the United
States’] prisons and jails soared from roughly 300,000 to more than 2 million.
By the end of 2007, more than 7 million Americans . . . were behind bars, on
probation, or on parole.”102 The United States incarcerates its population at
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6.
Id.
Id. Notably, the United States incarcerates more “of its black population than South Africa did at
the height of apartheid.” Id.
Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 562 n.3.
Editorial, The War on Drugs, HISTORY, (May 31, 2017), http://www.history.com/topics/the-waron-drugs.
Id.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 60.
[Most people] arrested for drug crimes are not charged with serious offenses, and most of
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a rate “six to ten times” more than “other industrialized nations.”103
Mass incarceration has disproportionately impacted people of color,
especially African-Americans and Latinos. Even though white people are
more likely than black people to sell drugs, black people are more likely to
end up incarcerated for selling drugs.104 Black people are over five times
more likely than white people to be incarcerated in state prisons throughout
the United States, and in some states, the disparity between white and black
people is even higher.105 Maryland’s prison population is nearly 75%
black,106 even though black people only comprise about 30% of Maryland’s
total population.107 Latinos “are imprisoned at a rate that is 1.4 times the
rate of whites” in state prisons throughout the United States.108 In
Massachusetts, Latinos are over four times more likely than white people to
be imprisoned.109 In New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, Latinos are
over three times more likely to face incarceration than white people.110
Because of felony disenfranchisement laws, the disparities in
incarceration rates by race ultimately become disparities in voting rights.
Regardless of the reasons for the disparities, if targeted criminal justice
reforms are not made, the disproportionate impact on African-Americans
and Latinos will only increase.111 If existing trends continue, “one in six

103
104

105

106
107
108
109
110
111

the people in state prison on drug charges have no history of violence or significant selling
activity. Those who are “kingpins” are often able to buy their freedom by forfeiting their
assets, snitching on other dealers, or becoming paid government informants.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 7; Christopher Ingraham, White People Are More Likely to Deal Drugs, but Black People Are More
Likely to Get Arrested for It, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/09/30/white-people-are-more-likely-to-deal-drugs-but-black-people-are-morelikely-to-get-arrested-for-it/.
ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/colorof-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/.
Id.
QuickFacts: Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MD (last visited
Mar. 7, 2019).
Nellis, supra note 105, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See generally Marc Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 37
HUM. RTS. 14–16 (Fall 2010) (explaining that criminal justice reform activists have put forth
numerous hypotheses to explain the cause of racial disparities in the criminal justice system,
including inequitable access to resources, legislation which disproportionately impacts black and
brown people, overt racial bias, and higher crime rates); see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR
PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 5–9 (2008) (proposing there is a notable difference between
rates of offending and rates of arrest); id. at 5 (arguing that figures which only report arrests “reflect
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Latino men”112 and “[o]ne in three young African-American men will serve
time in prison . . . and in some cities more than half of all young adult black
men are [already] under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation
or parole.”113 Thus, because mass incarceration disproportionately affects
African-Americans and Latinos, the voting strength of both groups is diluted
because of felony disenfranchisement laws.114
B. How Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Undermine the Principles of Democracy and
the Goals of the Criminal Justice System
In 1964, Justice Warren wrote “the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights.”115 In a democracy, the right to vote is protective of all other rights.
It is antidemocratic to “hold citizens to account for violating our laws while
denying them a say over those laws.”116 Recognizing that disenfranchising
large swaths of the population is undemocratic, Israel, Canada, South Africa,
and other modern democracies around the world have recently restored
voting rights to inmates and ex-inmates.117 Like the United States, South
Africa has a history of segregation.118 The South African government’s
policy of apartheid, which officially segregated white and nonwhite South
Africans, officially ended in 1991.119 In 1999, the South African

112
113
114

115
116
117
118
119

the frequency with which crimes are reported, police decisions regarding offenses on which they
will concentrate their attention and resources, and the relative vulnerability of certain crimes to
arrest.”); id. at 6 (noting that while some people allege that the racial disparities in the criminal
justice system are because people of color commit more crimes, “empirical analyses do not support
this claim”).
Mauer, supra note 111, at 14.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 9; see also id. at 4–9 (hypothesizing that mass incarceration and felony disenfranchisement laws
“function . . . in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); Lauren Handelsman, Giving the Barking
Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1875, 1886 (2005) (explaining the history of disenfranchisement statutes that were implemented
and enforced after the Civil War); Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the
Black Vote: The Need for A Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1994) (“After such
discrimination removes more blacks from society than whites, disenfranchisement serves to remove
them from the ranks of black voter, the numbers of which are already comparatively lower than
whites.”).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
Gideon Yaffe, Give Felons and Prisoners the Right to Vote, WASH. POST (July 26, 2016),
http://wapo.st/2a7jHRD.
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 38 (comparing U.S. disenfranchisement with other countries).
See generally Apartheid, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/apartheid (last visited May 14,
2019) (stating segregation in South Africa started long before Apartheid).
Id.
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Constitutional Court wrote:
The universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and
democracy. The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity. Quite
literally, it says that everybody counts. In a country of great disparities of
wealth and power . . . exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same
democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a
single interactive polity.120

Especially in countries like the United States and South Africa with
histories of government-sponsored segregation, a democracy should be
inclusive. Ex-felons constitute a large group of people in the United States,121
and their exclusion from the political process is undemocratic and unjust.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has even “charged that U.S.
disenfranchisement policies are discriminatory and violate international
law.”122 Without the ability to vote and make their voices heard, ex-felons
will “continue to be denied decent housing, tuition vouchers, professional
licenses, secured loans, and even some parental privileges until they are able
to protect themselves through the electoral process.”123 Without the right to
vote, ex-felons will continue to face marginalization in every facet of society
through severe collateral consequences, which makes it extremely difficult
for ex-felons, as a group, to reenter society.124
One of the primary goals of the criminal justice system is
rehabilitation.125 A criminal justice system which is purely retributive
“introduces offenders to long-term risks that . . . increase their chances of
repeating the same problematic behaviors.”126 Effective rehabilitation has
been shown to decrease recidivism by 10–25%.127
Felony
disenfranchisement conflicts with the rehabilitative goals of the criminal
120
121
122
123

124

125

126
127

August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 10 para. 17 (S. Afr.).
See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 158.
HULL, supra note 29, at 35–36. One student comment proposed that ex-offenders should be treated
as a suspect class, arguing that the political process failures which plague ex-offenders as a class
make them politically powerless and especially vulnerable to prejudicial action by the government.
Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191,
1226–29 (2006) (describing the degree of discreteness and insularity of ex-felons).
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community
Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 204–05 (2004) (showing the correlation between
voting and incarceration).
See generally Mark R. Fondacaro et al., The Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile and Criminal Justice: New
Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 697 (2015); Beth M. Huebner, Rehabilitation, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0046.xml.
Fondacaro et al., supra note 125, at 710.
JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (7th ed.
2015).
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justice system by discouraging civic participation. Political theorist John
Stuart Mill hypothesized that democracy promotes active citizenship and
that regular participation in politics allows citizens to identify with society’s
norms and values.128 Accordingly, restoring voting rights to ex-felons may
“facilitate reintegration efforts” and perhaps even improve public safety.129
According to one study, there is a notable correlation between political
participation and rates of arrest, incarceration, and recidivism: “[a]mong
former arrestees, about 27% of . . . non-voters were re-arrested, relative to
12% of . . . voters.”130 The authors of the study noted their small sample size
and acknowledged that their ideas are “largely speculative” regarding voting
and its connection to crime.131 Still, they argued that “[v]oting appears to be
part of a package of pro-social behavior that is linked to desistance from
crime” and that “the right to vote remains the most powerful symbol of stakeholding in our democracy.”132 When ex-felons become engaged in their
communities by participating in the political process, “there is [at least] some
evidence that they will bring their behavior into line with the expectations of
the citizen role, avoiding further contact with the criminal justice system.”133
III. CHALLENGING FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS: WHY
LEGISLATION IS THE BEST ANSWER
Since Richardson v. Ramirez in 1974, voting rights advocates and criminal
justice activists have attempted to utilize numerous tools to challenge felony
disenfranchisement laws with little long-term, widespread, or replicable
success, including the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on intentional
racial discrimination, the Voting Rights Act134 (the “VRA”), and state
constitutions. However, all of these tools are inadequate and have failed to
produce systemic change. Thus, this Article argues that Congress should
adopt a federal statute which provides that states cannot disenfranchise
people on the basis of a prior felony conviction or prior felony convictions
for which they have completed their sentences.

128
129
130
131

132
133
134

Uggen & Manza, supra note 124, at 198.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 195 (“Establishing a causal relationship between voting . . . and recidivism would require a
large-scale longitudinal survey that tracked released felons in their communities and closely
monitored changes in their political and criminal behavior. At present, no such data exist.”).
Id. at 214–15.
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 163.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
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A. The Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
In most challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws, plaintiffs make
claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
and Section 2 of the VRA. Section 2 has been a “source of considerable—
and ultimately unsuccessful—litigation in recent years.”135 Section 2 was not
particularly significant at first because it simply reaffirmed the guarantees of
the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in voting.136
Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to include a “results” test which bars
voting practices with racially discriminatory results with no intent
requirement, which transformed Section 2 into a powerful tool in and of
itself.137 The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the
applicability of Section 2 of the VRA to felony disenfranchisement laws.138
Thus, circuits are split as to how they apply it in the context of felony
disenfranchisement lawsuits.139
The only successful challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws have
been constitutional challenges based on intentional racial discrimination,
specifically “claims of impermissible discrimination in the definition of
disenfranchisement-triggering offenses.”140 Although challenges to felony
disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection Clause have had more
success than challenges under Section 2 of the VRA, the Equal Protection

135
136
137

138

139
140

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 887 (5th ed. 2016).
TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 26–27.
See generally id. at 112–36 (discussing the “results” test and successive cases interpreting it). There
are two types of Section 2 claims: 1) vote dilution claims and 2) vote denial claims. Daniel P. Tokaji,
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006).
A vote dilution claim addresses “practices that diminish minorities’ political influence in places
where they are allowed to vote. Chief examples of vote-dilution practices include at-large elections
and redistricting plans that keep minorities’ voting strength weak.” Id. A vote denial claim
addresses “practices that prevent people from voting or having their votes counted. . . . [E]xamples
[include] literacy tests, poll taxes, all-white primaries, and English-only ballots.” Id. Voting rights
advocates continue to find new and innovative ways to utilize the VRA. Id. “The first generation
of VRA enforcement focused mainly on vote denial, while the second generation . . . focused mainly
on vote dilution. The application of the VRA to practices such as felon disenfranchisement, voting
machines, and voter ID laws represents a new generation of VRA enforcement.” Id. at 691–92.
See Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 137, at 700–01 (noting that three federal courts of appeal
have considered questions regarding felony disenfranchisement laws). Because the Supreme Court
has never specifically articulated a standard for Section 2 claims in the context of felony
disenfranchisement laws, “the legal standard applicable to felon disenfranchisement and other voter
qualifications under Section 2 of the VRA is anything but clear.” Id. at 701.
Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005); Roger Clegg et al., The Case Against Felon
Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2008).
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 887.
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Clause is still an ineffective tool for challenging most felony
disenfranchisement laws because it requires proof of intentional racial
discrimination, which is notoriously difficult to prove.141
The Supreme Court addressed the Equal Protection Clause as applied
to felony disenfranchisement laws in Hunter v. Underwood in 1985.142 In Hunter,
the Court issued a unanimous opinion, holding that Section 182 of the
Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchised those convicted of numerous
enumerated crimes and “crimes involving moral turpitude,” was
unconstitutionally adopted to intentionally discriminate on the basis of
race.143 The Court acknowledged that deciphering legislative intent is a
difficult task but noted that the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901
“was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to
disenfranchise blacks” and that “[t]he delegates to the all-white convention
were not secretive about their purpose.”144 The President of the convention
even “stated in his opening address: ‘And what is it that we want to do? . . .
[T]o establish white supremacy in this State.’”145 Further, “the suffrage
committee [of the convention] selected such crimes as vagrancy, living in
adultery, and wife beating that were thought to be more commonly
committed by blacks.”146 The Court limited the Hunter holding and reasoned
that it did not conflict with the holding in Ramirez because Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not created to allow for intentional racial
discrimination, which violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.147
The Court noted that the Ramirez opinion did not suggest otherwise.148
After Hunter, voting rights advocates brought additional challenges to
felony disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection Clause, but
circuit courts have only rarely found state laws to have been adopted with
discriminatory intent. In 1995 in McLaughlin v. City of Canton, a district court
in Mississippi found that the plaintiff’s assertion that the Mississippi
Constitution’s disenfranchising provision was adopted with racially
discriminatory intent had “credible support,” but it did not rule specifically
141

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

See infra text accompanying notes 151–70. But see McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954,
978 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff’s equal protection disenfranchisement attack had
credible merit).
471 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. (quoting 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA, MAY 21ST, 1901, TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901, at 8 (1940)).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id.
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on this issue because “the key points of this attack were not briefed, nor
argued.”149 However, the court applied strict scrutiny to Mississippi’s
disenfranchisement law and concluded that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause to disenfranchise the plaintiff because of a misdemeanor conviction
since the state had not demonstrated a substantial and compelling reason for
its law.150
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit rejected a similar claim. In Cotton v. Fordice,
a then-incarcerated inmate challenged his disenfranchisement under the
Mississippi Constitution, arguing that the provision which disenfranchised
him was originally adopted with racially discriminatory intent.151 The Fifth
Circuit held that “the state was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
blacks,” but the subsequent amendments to the provision “removed the
discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”152 Thus, while the
Equal Protection Clause has produced more success than other litigation
tools in the context of felony disenfranchisement laws, it is still an unreliable
tool, along with Section 2 of the VRA.
The Natural Rights Center filed a lawsuit in Tennessee, the birthplace
of the Ku Klux Klan,153 a year after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hunter, in
the first felony disenfranchisement case after the VRA’s 1982 amendment.154
The Natural Rights Center alleged violations of both the Equal Protection
Clause and Section 2 of the VRA.155 In Wesley v. Collins, Charles Wesley, a
black male who had been disenfranchised by pleading guilty “to a charge of
accessory after the fact to the crime of larceny,”156 made similar claims to
those in Hunter.157 He argued that a Tennessee statute that disenfranchised
those convicted of “infamous crimes”158 was intentionally racially
discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.159 Wesley also

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
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947 F. Supp. 954, 978 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
Id. at 976.
157 F.3d 388, 389–90 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 391.
Ku Klux Klan, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/ku-klux-klan (last updated Mar. 13,
2019).
See supra notes 136–137, 142, 144 and accompanying text.
Ku Klux Klan, supra note 153.
Wesley v. Collins (Wesley I), 605 F. Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1986).
See id. (discussing the plaintiffs’ claims alleging that the Tennessee Voting Rights Act of 1981 denied
them Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment Rights and rights secured under the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982).
Id. at 804. The phrase “infamous crimes” was defined as felony convictions. Wesley v. Collins
(Wesley II), 791 F.2d at 1258.
Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 804.
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argued that the statute violated Section 2 of the VRA because it “result[ed]
in the unlawful dilution of the black community’s voting strength.”160
However, a district court dismissed the lawsuit,161 and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, noting that Wesley had not
presented sufficient evidence to prove that the Tennessee legislature had
acted with discriminatory intent so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
nor had Wesley shown that the disproportionate impact on black voters had
resulted from any state “qualification[s] of the right to vote on account of
race or color” so as to violate Section 2 of the VRA.162 The district court
noted that the statute at issue did not deny ex-felons the right to vote based
on race but instead based on a “conscious decision to commit an act for
which they assume the risks of detection and punishment.”163
In affirming the district court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals went so far as to say that “the further discovery requested by
plaintiffs would be in the nature of a fishing expedition for unspecified
evidence,”164 even though Wesley had provided evidence of a history of
official state-sanctioned discrimination and mistreatment of black people in
Tennessee “marked by limited access to and segregation in the provision of
health care, housing and education, and by sustained efforts to prevent blacks
from registering to vote.”165 Wesley also showed that, as a result of the lasting
legacy of that discrimination, “the ratio of white felons to the general
population of Tennessee whites [was] approximately 1 to 1000, while the
corresponding black ratio [was] 1 to 100.”166
Critics of the Wesley II decision have noted that “[b]y demanding proof
that a disputed electoral practice was motivated by racial discrimination,
[the] court reintroduced the ‘intent’ requirement that Congress enacted the
[Voting Rights Act’s] 1982 amendments expressly to disavow.”167 In
Wesley II, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals basically increased the proof
requirement for a Section 2 violation from a “results” test into a variation of
the Equal Protection Clause’s intent requirement, which renders Section 2
essentially useless without evidence of a smoking gun, like the Equal
Protection Clause.168 The Fourth Circuit followed suit in Howard v. Gilmore,
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id. at 814.
Wesley II, 791 F.2d at 1262–63.
Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 813.
Wesley II, 791 F.2d at 1262–63.
Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 804.
Id.
HULL, supra note 29, at 108.
Id.
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reasoning that:
[A Section 2] plaintiff must establish that [the government’s] act either was
intended to, or had the effect of . . . denying the right to vote based upon
race. . . . Virginia’s exclusion of felons from the franchise pre-dates the
enfranchisement of African-Americans. . . . [and the plaintiff] failed to plead
any nexus between the disenfranchisement of felons and race.169

A causal “nexus” requirement is arguably a restatement of the intent
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.170
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly requires a showing of
intentional discrimination for a Section 2 violation.171 In 2010, in Farrakhan
v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), the court held that “plaintiffs bringing a section 2
VRA challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law based on the operation of
a state’s criminal justice system must at least show that the criminal justice
system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.”172 In Farrakhan I, the
court held that “statistical evidence” of “racial disparities” in “Washington’s
criminal justice system” could provide evidence of a Section 2 violation, but
Farrakhan II held that Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I) “swe[pt] too
broadly.”173 The court noted that felony disenfranchisement “takes effect
only after an individual has been found guilty of a crime,” and that the
criminal justice system “has its own unique safeguards and remedies against
arbitrary, invidious or mistaken conviction.”174 The court went so far as to
note that even the required showing of intent as applied to a felony
disenfranchisement law might not “necessarily establish” a Section 2
violation.175
Several circuit courts have held that Section 2 does not even apply to
felony disenfranchisement laws. In Johnson v. Bush, a 2005 challenge to
Florida’s felony disenfranchisement provision of the Florida Constitution, a
district court granted summary judgment to defendants, members of
Florida’s Clemency Board.176 Plaintiffs claimed that Florida’s law had been
adopted with racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and had a racially disproportionate effect in violation of

169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
HULL, supra note 29, at 108.
Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 992–93 (quoting and citing Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 993–94.
405 F.3d 1214, 1215–17 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Section 2 of the VRA.177 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court’s judgment, holding that plaintiffs were unable to provide
the requisite showing of intent for the Equal Protection Clause claim.178 As
proof of racial animus, plaintiffs had provided statements made after the 1868
Constitutional Convention at which Florida’s felony disenfranchisement
provision was adopted, but the court found that those racially biased
statements were not adequately contemporaneous enough to prove racially
discriminatory intent.179 Further, the court relied heavily on the fact that
Florida amended and re-enacted its disenfranchisement provision in 1968,
narrowing it to disenfranchise only those with felony convictions.180 Like the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cotton,181 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that, even if Florida’s disenfranchisement provision had
been originally adopted with racially discriminatory intent, its re-enactment
had cleansed it from “allegedly discriminatory” motives.182 The court
declined to apply Section 2 to Florida’s law, reasoning that Congress had
intended to “exclude felon disenfranchisement provisions from Voting Rights
Act scrutiny.”183 The court distinguished felony disenfranchisement laws
from other laws creating voting qualifications by noting that felony
disenfranchisement laws are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and are
a punitive device stemming from criminal law.”184 The court cited Ramirez
and noted that “despite [Section 2’s] broad language, [it] does not prohibit
all voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect.”185
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that Florida had
“discretion to deny the vote to convicted felons,” regardless of the impact.186

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1219–23.
Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1224.
See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1224.
Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1228.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, in Hayden v. Pataki, a 2006 case which challenged felon
disenfranchisement laws in New York under the VRA’s “results” test, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the VRA did not “encompass
felon disenfranchisement laws.”187 In spite of evidence that New York
disproportionately “penalize[d] black and Hispanic felons far out of
proportion to their numbers,”188 the court reasoned that, even though a
literal reading of the text of the VRA would likely apply to felony
disenfranchisement laws, “[h]ere, there are persuasive reasons to believe that
Congress did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement provisions
within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act.”189 As evidence of Congress’s
alleged intent to exclude felons from VRA coverage, the court mentioned:
(1) the explicit approval given such laws in the Fourteenth Amendment; (2)
the long history and continuing prevalence of felon disenfranchisement
provisions throughout the United States; (3) the statements in the House and
Senate Judiciary Committee Reports and on the Senate floor explicitly
excluding felon disenfranchisement laws from provisions of the statute; (4)
the absence of any affirmative consideration of felon disenfranchisement
laws during either the 1965 passage of the Act or its 1982 revision; (5) the
introduction thereafter of bills specifically intended to include felon
disenfranchisement provisions within the VRA’s coverage; (6) the enactment
of a felon disenfranchisement statute for the District of Columbia by
Congress soon after the passage of the Voting Rights Act; and (7) the
subsequent passage of statutes designed to facilitate the removal of
convicted felons from the voting rolls.190

In a notable dissenting opinion, Judge Parker noted a relationship
between mass incarceration, forbidden race discrimination, and voting,
arguing that “the fact that felon disenfranchisement statutes may sometimes
be constitutional does not mean they are always constitutional.”191 The
district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings
rather than allowing for a summary judgment record, as Judge Parker
preferred.192 Judge Parker argued that plaintiffs should at least be able to
develop a substantive record.193 He reasoned as follows:
Suppose, for example, [plaintiffs] were able to demonstrate that the
dramatically different incarceration rates for minorities and Whites in New
York were largely driven by drug convictions and reflected the manner in
which law enforcement resources were deployed in the “war on drugs.”
Suppose they showed that law enforcement officials (and task forces)
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden II), 449 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2006).
HULL, supra note 29, at 108–09.
Hayden II, 449 F.3d at 315.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 345 (Parker, J., dissenting).
Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden I), No. 00-CV-8586, 2004 WL 1335921, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004).
Hayden II, 449 F.3d at 344–345 (Parker, J., dissenting).
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concentrated resources on street-level users/dealers of heroin and crack
cocaine in minority neighborhoods (because the problems were worse and
arrests were easier in such areas) but, at the same time, devoted
comparatively little attention to areas where Whites were abusing those same
illegal drugs at the same rates (and powder cocaine at higher rates). Suppose
they also showed that Whites received probation three times as frequently as
similarly situated Blacks or Latinos for similar crimes. Neither showing is
remotely beyond the realm of possibility in New York, and I believe this type
of proof could constitute some evidence of a VRA violation.194

Judge Parker further cited the plain meaning of the statute as evidence
that the VRA should apply to felony disenfranchisement claims,195 but the
majority rejected Parker’s argument, reasoning that they “must . . . look
beyond the plain text of the statute in construing the reach of its
provisions”196 because the literal reading of the text would conflict with the
intentions of those who drafted it.197
The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Hayden II majority in
Simmons v. Galvin.198 In 2000, voters in Massachusetts adopted Article 120,
which altered the Massachusetts Constitution to disenfranchise “currently
incarcerated felons.”199 A group of incarcerated felons challenged the statute
under Section 2.200 The court held that Section 2 did not apply to felony
disenfranchisement laws, reasoning that “[w]hen we look at the terms of the
original VRA as a whole, the context, and recognized sources of
congressional intent, it is clear [that Section 2] . . . was not meant to create a
cause of action against a state which disenfranchises its incarcerated
felons.”201 When Congress amended the VRA in 1982, it did so “‘to make
clear that certain practices and procedures . . . are forbidden even though the
absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects them from constitutional
challenge’ . . . . Felon disqualification was not” one of them, the court
reasoned.202 The court expressly stated that it agreed “with the Second
Circuit in Hayden that the seven circumstances203 it identifie[d] all necessitate

194
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196
197
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200
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Id. at 345.
Id. at 346–48.
Id. at 315 (majority opinion).
See id. at 322–23 (“[W]e deem this one of the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989))).
Simmons v. Galvin (Simmons I), 575 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 39 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991)).
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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the conclusion that . . . this claim is not actionable.”204 Notably, in 2010, the
Supreme Court issued a one-sentence certiorari denial and declined to hear
the Simmons I plaintiffs’ appeal.205 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will resolve the circuit split on Section 2 anytime soon.
Accordingly, both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as applied to felony
disenfranchisement laws are ineffective tools which have not worked to create
mass systemic change. The Equal Protection Clause’s intent requirement
basically necessitates a smoking gun to prove purposeful and intentional
racial animus as applied to felony disenfranchisement laws; the standard of
racially discriminatory intent is extremely burdensome.206 As a result, very
few challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection
Clause have succeeded.207 In the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, proof of a
Section 2 violation arguably requires an onerous variation of proof of intent
in the form of a causal nexus.208 At the very least, both circuits have declined
to invalidate felony disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 of the VRA.209
The Ninth Circuit expressly requires a showing of intentional discrimination
as proof of a Section 2 violation.210 In the First, Second, and Eleventh
Circuits, Section 2 does not even apply to felony disenfranchisement laws,
regardless of the disproportionate impact the laws may or may not have on
protected minority groups.211 Both the Equal Protection Clause and Section
2 require a fragmented and disconnected fact-specific approach to challenge
felony disenfranchisement laws, and most courts have repeatedly shown a
reluctance to invalidate the laws under either approach.

204
205
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Simmons I, 575 F.3d at 42.
Simmons v. Galvin (Simmons II), 562 U.S. 980 (2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 151–70.
See supra notes 140–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–70 and accompanying text.
See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (per curiam)
(affirming the lower court’s summary disposition rather than questioning felony disenfranchisement
provisions); Wesley II, 791 F.2d 1255, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming the lower court’s summary
disposition rather than questioning felony disenfranchisement provisions).
See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176–205 and accompanying text.
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B. State Constitution Challenges
Challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under state constitutions
have fared similarly. In a challenge to New Jersey’s felon disenfranchisement
law, plaintiffs argued that New Jersey’s disenfranchisement statute, which
disenfranchised “all people on parole or probation for indictable offenses,”
violated the state’s equal protection doctrine under the state constitution.212
Plaintiffs did not argue that the statute had been adopted with discriminatory
intent but argued only that the New Jersey criminal justice system
discriminated against African-Americans and Hispanics, “thereby
disproportionately increasing their population among parolees and
probationers and diluting their political power.”213 The Appellate Division
of New Jersey’s Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the
complaint, reasoning that there was an express textual warrant for felon
disenfranchisement in the New Jersey Constitution.214 The court noted that,
if the statute had been adopted with racially discriminatory intent, it would
violate New Jersey’s equal protection doctrine, but disparate impact related
to a facially neutral statute was “an insufficient basis for relief.”215
In Iowa, Kelli Griffin challenged the loss of her voting rights after her
conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.216 The Iowa Constitution
disenfranchises those convicted of an “infamous crime.”217 She argued that
her nonviolent drug offense did not qualify as an “infamous crime.”218
However, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling and
concluded that Iowa’s Constitution allows for disenfranchisement of felons
“until pardoned or otherwise restored to the rights of citizenship.”219 The
court noted that felony disenfranchisement disproportionately impacts black
people and other racial groups but stated that “this outcome is tied to our
criminal justice system as a whole and is not isolated to the use of the
infamous-crime standard.”220 Further, there was no evidence that the state
had adopted the “infamous crimes” language with the intent to discriminate
based on race.221 The court said that it would be up to Iowa’s “future

212
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214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

N.J. State Conference-NAACP v. Harvey, 885 A.2d 445, 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 446–48.
Id. at 448.
Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 183 (Iowa 2016); see supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
Griffin, 884 N.W.2d at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id.
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democracy” to address the issues associated with felony disenfranchisement
laws.222
Like challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA, state
constitutional challenges have failed to produce widespread systemic change.
Additionally, even if future challenges under state constitutions led to
restoration of voting rights for ex-felons in that particular state, it is unlikely
that those results would be replicable because state constitutions vary widely.
Thus, the necessity for nationwide uniform relief for ex-felons in the form of
a federal statute is all the more imperative.
C. The Necessity of a Federal Statute
The traditional litigation tools used to challenge infringements on the
right to vote have not succeeded at providing relief from archaic felony
disenfranchisement laws. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause has resulted in a few victories, but the standard of proof of intentional
discrimination is extremely difficult to meet. Although some cases may
present facts allowing for an Equal Protection challenge, those cases are few
and far between. Section 2 of the VRA held promise after the 1982
amendments which altered the proof requirement from an intent standard
to a “results” test. However, courts have chipped away at Section 2 in
subsequent litigation in the context of felony disenfranchisement laws so that,
depending on the circuit in which a challenge is brought, Section 2 either
does not apply to felony disenfranchisement laws at all, or the standard of
proof is basically or expressly one of intent. Challenges under state
constitutions have also failed to provide long-term or replicable solutions,
and a state-by-state approach is inefficient regardless of the potential relief
under individual state constitutions. Highly tailored litigation under each
state’s constitution does not provide comprehensive relief. Even legislation
on a state-by-state basis is problematic; the issue of felony disenfranchisement
should not be left to the states to individually legislate because it would likely
result in a patchwork of relief from felony disenfranchisement laws which
would leave ex-felons in certain areas of the United States with no solution.223
222
223

Id. at 205.
See, e.g., HULL, supra note 29, at 91 (arguing that “Congress alone can overcome the obstructionist
and parochial interests that historically have prevented individual states from democratizing their
voting procedures”); Lynn Eisenberg, States As Laboratories for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon
Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 582 (2012) (arguing that the theory
of states as “laboratories of democracy” encourages states to seek regional solutions rather than
national ones and that the federal government is best suited to address the issue of felony
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Thus, the best solution with the most potential for a comprehensive and
uniform approach, the solution which would have the greatest impact by
restoring voting rights to the most people, is a federal statute.224
In recent years, criminal justice reform has gained momentum and
bipartisan support. In the United States’ current political climate, there are
very few substantive areas where Democrats and Republicans agree, but the
importance of criminal justice reform is one of them.225 However, felony
disenfranchisement laws are still a polarizing issue with laws varying widely
depending on the state. A few politicians have recognized the injustice of
felony disenfranchisement laws and have voiced support for restoring voting
rights to ex-felons. In 2014, Republican Senator Rand Paul told a Kentucky
State Senate committee debating an amendment to the Kentucky
Constitution which would restore voting rights to some ex-felons that “[k]ids
do make mistakes. White kids make mistakes. Black kids make mistakes.
Brown kids make mistakes . . . [b]ut when you look at the prison population,
three out of the four people in prison are black or brown.”226 Democratic

224

225

226

disenfranchisement). But see, e.g., Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs.
Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 399–400 (2002) (arguing that a federal statute restoring voting rights
would face practical and logistical issues and that “local legislators may be more likely to change
state disenfranchisement laws because they operate on a smaller, more flexible scale and are less
likely” to face public scrutiny).
Another option is a constitutional amendment, but a constitutional amendment is extremely
unlikely. The Constitution has been amended only seventeen times since 1791. Additional
Amendments of the Constitution, BILL OF RTS. INST., https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/foundingdocuments/additional-amendments/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). Many of the amendments to the
Constitution have expanded voting rights. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment extended the franchise
to ex-slaves, and the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments did the same for women and
citizens eighteen and older, respectively. See HULL, supra note 29, at 82. Still, it is unlikely that
restoration of the right to vote to ex-felons would garner the requisite support for a constitutional
amendment because a constitutional amendment requires “a two-thirds majority vote in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate or . . . a constitutional convention called for by two-thirds
of the State legislatures.” Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). At the
beginning of each new legislative session during the 2000s, Representative Jesse Jackson Jr.
proposed a right-to-vote constitutional amendment, which would have guaranteed the franchise to
every American citizen over eighteen years old. See HULL, supra note 29, at 87. The proposed
amendment eventually gained over fifty co-sponsors, but it still did not get much attention. John
Nichols, Time for a ‘Right to Vote’ Constitutional Amendment, NATION (Mar. 5, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/time-right-vote-constitutional-amendment/.
Noah Atchison, Bipartisan Efforts on Criminal Justice Reform Continue, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June
27,
2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/bipartisan-efforts-criminal-justice-reformcontinue.
Halimah Abdullah, Rand Paul Fights for Felon Voting Rights, CNN (Feb. 19, 2014, 7:38 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/19/politics/rand-paul-felon-voting/index.html.
Rand Paul’s
efforts “stalled in the legislature.” Zachary Roth, Kentucky Restores Voting Rights to Ex-Felons, CNN
(Nov. 24, 2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/kentucky-restores-voting-rights-ex-
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Senator Cory Booker’s website notes that “[p]unishment is a vital component
of our criminal justice system, but once someone has paid their debt to
society, their rights as citizens should be restored. Our country is strongest
when all Americans have a say in the political process.”227 Several states have
also made important reforms over the past few years. Legislatures in both
Maryland and Wyoming recently adopted legislation which automatically
restores voting rights to ex-felons.228 Still, legislators’ past attempts at
enacting a federal statute were unsuccessful, but as public support for
restoration continues to increase, hopefully a federal statute will become a
real possibility, although the constitutionality of such a statute is unclear.229
Congress may or may not have the authority to enact a statute which
restores voting rights to ex-felons. In 1999, Michigan Representative John
Conyers introduced the Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999,
which aimed to restore the franchise to ex-felons.230 The Act never made it
out of the Judiciary Committee.231 However, at a subcommittee hearing,
Gillian Metzger, an attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law, reasoned that Congress has broad authority to
regulate federal elections under the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of
the Constitution and the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.232 She argued that Congress has the power to restore voting

227
228
229

230
231
232

felons. Kentucky continues to have some of the harshest felony disenfranchisement laws in the
United States. Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Kentucky, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-kentucky.
Civil Rights, U.S. SEN. CORY BOOKER: PRIORITIES, https://www.booker.senate.gov/
?p=issue&id=77 (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
HULL, supra note 29, at 86–89 (describing unsuccessful legislative attempts and constitutional
uncertainty surrounding restoring felon voting rights). While most Americans are opposed to
allowing currently incarcerated inmates to cast a ballot, 60% of Americans support restoring the
right to vote to ex-felons who have completed their sentences and are out on parole. Christopher
Uggen, What Americans Believe About Voting Rights for Criminals, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/what-americans-believe-aboutvoting-rights-criminals. Nearly 70% support restoring voting rights to those “under supervised
probation in the community.” Id. The movement to restore voting rights to ex-felons who have
completed their sentences is gaining traction around the United States but remains politically
polarizing. Zachary Roth, Push to Restore Voting Rights for Felons Gathers Momentum, MSNBC (Mar. 20,
2015, 6:56 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/push-restore-voting-rights-felons-gathersmomentum.
Price, supra note 223, at 396 (documenting recent federal legislative attempts to reform felon voting
rights).
Id.
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Constitution of the Comm.
on the Judiciary on H.R. 906, 106th Cong. 19–28 (1999) (statement of Gillian Metzger, Staff Attorney,
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rights to ex-felons in federal elections through the Elections Clause because
that clause “has been interpreted consistently to give Congress an
extraordinarily broad power to regulate Federal elections.”233 Metzger
further argued that the right to vote is a fundamental right, and that Congress
“clearly has the authority to enact laws to protect the rights protected by [the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth] amendments.”234 She emphasized the importance
of considering the history of felony disenfranchisement laws and their usage
after the Civil War, “along with poll taxes [and] literacy tests” and argued
that “history combined with the extraordinary disparate impact that these
provisions have today should . . . clearly sustain a basis for concluding that
Congress has the power to” enact legislation restoring voting rights to exfelons.235
However, Viet Dinh, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General under
George W. Bush, maintains that Congress only has the authority to legislate
the time, place, and manner of elections rather than voter qualifications.236
According to Dinh, Article I:
[E]xpressly differentiates between the “qualifications” of voters in House
elections, stipulated in Section 2, which must be the same as the
qualifications for voters for the most numerous body in the state legislature,
and the “Times, Places and Manners” of such elections that is addressed in
Article I, Section 4.237

Whether or not a federal statute restoring voting rights to ex-felons would
be constitutional, reservations about the constitutionality of a federal statute
should not stop Congress from taking action. In Richardson v. Ramirez, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that arguments about felon
disenfranchisement should be “addressed to the legislative forum.”238 The
constitutionality of a law restoring voting rights to ex-felons would likely
depend on the particular text of the law, and a federal statute is still the best
solution for comprehensive reform.

233
234
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Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U.).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id.
HULL, supra note 29, at 94.
Id.
418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
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CONCLUSION
Although the history of felony disenfranchisement laws may be lengthy,
the history of a practice does not establish its legality or righteousness. When
felony disenfranchisement laws were originally implemented in the
American colonies, and after the Reconstruction era when
disenfranchisement laws became more widespread, the incarceration rate in
the United States was much lower.239 Thus, even if the Drafters of the
Reconstruction
Amendments
originally
approved
of
felony
disenfranchisement laws and purposefully provided an express textual
warrant for the practice in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the
Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez,240 it is unclear whether or not
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would approve of the practice of
disenfranchising felons today in light of the realities of mass incarceration. It
is unlikely that the Drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments would have
imagined the federal government or the states’ governments criminalizing
such a wide variety of behaviors, especially nonviolent behaviors.241 It is also
unlikely that the Drafters would have anticipated that so many people would
end up incarcerated and therefore vulnerable to the loss of the right to vote.
Over 6 million people are currently prohibited from voting,242 which is more
than the entire populations of Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Delaware, and Montana combined.243
Mass incarceration disproportionately affects people of color.244 People
of color are more likely than white people to lose their right to vote because
of felony disenfranchisement laws.245 In a democracy, the disproportionate
effect of mass incarceration on people of color, and the subsequent loss of
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See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 40–58 (detailing the history of mass incarceration in the
United States).
See supra Section I.B.
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 31 (noting that “[w]hen the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, disenfranchisement applied only to those convicted of felonies at common law, a far more
limited class of offenses than the modern conception of ‘felony’”). The majority of ex-felons who
have lost the right to vote were not convicted of violent offenses. Id. at 8. “Murderers and rapists
make up about 4 percent of the felons convicted in recent years.” Id. Approximately a third of exfelons were convicted of drug offenses. Id. Other ex-felons were “convicted of property crimes
(such as burglary), various white-collar offenses (such as fraud or forgery), and even driving-related
offenses (such as multiple drunk driving incidents).” Id.
UGGEN ET AL., supra note 17.
US States - Ranked by Population, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/
states/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2018).
See supra Section II.A.
Id.
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voting rights which incarceration involves, should not be tolerated. Thus,
whether felony disenfranchisement laws are intentionally racist or not, they
are objectionable in unjustly diluting the votes of people of color. Even
though courts have generally held that disparate impact is not enough to
challenge felony disenfranchisement laws,246 Congress should consider that
disparate impact and adopt a federal statute that eliminates it.
People who have completed their sentences should not have to keep
paying and repaying a debt to society in perpetuity. If one of the main
purposes of the criminal justice system is rehabilitation and eventual
reintegration into society as a contributing member of society, the right to
vote should not be restricted permanently. Former felons should not need a
law degree or an attorney in order to navigate the path to restoring their right
to vote, and until the day the Supreme Court decides to revisit its ruling in
Richardson v. Ramirez, it falls to Congress to develop a federal solution.

246

See supra Section III.A.

